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Abstract
Improvisation is ubiquitous in life. It deserves, we suggest, to occupy a more central role in cognitive science. In the current 
paper, we take the case of jazz improvisation as a rich model domain from which to explore the nature of improvisation and 
expertise more generally. We explore the activity of the jazz improviser against the theoretical backdrop of Dreyfus’s account 
of expertise as well as of enactivist and 4E accounts of cognition and action. We argue that enactivist and 4E accounts pro-
vide a rich source of insights on improvisation that go beyond Dreyfus’s notion of skilled coping, for example, through the 
central enactivist notion of “sense-making”. At the same time, however, we see improvisation as suggesting an extension 
of enactivist theory. We see expert improvisers, in music and in life, as walking on a path of open-ended expansion of their 
mindful experiential relation with their doing. At the heart of an improviser’s expertise (and of day-to-day living), we pro-
pose, lies a form of “higher-level inner sense-making” that spontaneously creates novel forms of agentive goal-directedness 
in the moment. Our account thus supplants Dreyfus’s idea of the ego-less absorbed expert by that of an improviser enacting 
spontaneous expressions of a self, in music or in life.
Keywords Improvisation · Music · Jazz · Music cognition · Expertise · Skills · Enactivism · Embodied cognition · 4E 
cognition · Phenomenology · Sense-making · Temporality · Absorbed coping · Rationality · Mindfulness · Mindlessness
There is a Japanese visual art in which the artist is 
forced to be spontaneous. He must paint on a thin 
stretched parchment with a special brush and black 
water paint in such a way that an unnatural or inter-
rupted stroke will destroy the line or break through 
the parchment. Erasures or changes are impossible. 
These artists must practise a particular discipline, that 
of allowing the idea to express itself in communica-
tion with their hands in such a direct way that delib-
eration cannot interfere.... This conviction that direct 
deed is the most meaningful reflections, I believe, has 
prompted the evolution of the extremely severe and 
unique disciplines of the jazz or improvising musician.
Bill Evans, Back Cover notes to the original Long Play 
release of Kind of Blue (Davis et al. 1959).
Sudnow’s detailed description of his acquisition of the 
skilled hands of a jazz pianist shows the limitations of 
a cognitivism that thinks that having a skill consists of 
interiorizing the theory of a domain.
Hubert Dreyfus, Preface to David Sudnow, Ways of the 
Hand: A Rewritten Account (2001, pp. ix–x).
In 1978, the social anthropologist David Sudnow wrote a 
detailed autobiographical account, inspired by (among other 
things) Merleau-Ponty’s embodied phenomenology, of how 
he acquired the expertise of a professional jazz musician. 
Hubert Dreyfus, in his foreword to the 2001 edition of Sud-
now’s Ways of the Hand, wrote that jazz piano improvisation 
provides “a paradigm case of. .. the ways embodied beings 
acquire the skills of giving order to, or, better, finding order 
in, our temporally unfolding experience.” Dreyfus portrays 
Sudnow’s self-exploration as concretising Merleau-Ponty’s 
work via a detailed exploration of how (in Dreyfus’s view) 
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the expert jazz-player’s hands take over from the jazz-learn-
er’s rule-following ego.
The present paper takes the jazz improviser’s art as a 
starting point for the investigation of two, linked, clusters of 
issues within the philosophy and sciences of mind: focusing 
on improvisation on the one hand, and skill and mindedness 
on the other.
1. The first group of issues concerns how the experience of 
jazz sheds light on the role of improvisation generally—
not just in music or art, but in our day to day activities. 
Improvisation turns out to be a key phenomenon, ubiqui-
tous in our lives. Greater attention to it is, in our view, long 
overdue. We examine a variety of facets of improvisation, 
in the context of the thought of Dreyfus and of enactive 
approaches. We argue that reflective study of jazz improvi-
sation will provide insights into how we improvise our way 
through life; and this in turn will provide a significant new 
perspective on embodied cognition and agency.
2. The second group of issues takes jazz piano as a special 
example of a particular core element of enactive the-
ory as such: skilled proficiency. Dreyfus’s interest in Sud-
now’s description of his journey from novice to expert 
improviser holds a particular interest in this regard. For 
Dreyfus it was a specific case to illustrate his wider con-
cerns with skilled activity in general. As is well known, 
Dreyfus considered the skills of the expert practitioner 
to exemplify a form of fluent, embodied, “absorbed cop-
ing” where mindful attention to the prescriptive rules or 
canons governing that field had dropped away. However, 
critical pressure has been put on this idea of skilled “ego-
lessness” in fluent skilled activity from many quarters. 
We will look at the debate that has grown up, and we will 
argue that jazz improvisation is a focus case in which an 
entanglement between mindful and mindless processes is 
particularly clear. This provides a nuanced intervention 
in this debate, related to the above new perspective on 
embodied cognition and agency.
1  Improvising our way through life
Jazz improvisation has been both a theoretical and a musi-
cal encounter between the two authors of this paper. For 
some years we have explored improvisation, through peri-
odic conversations in private, and via joint presentations in 
public with illustrative performances on two pianos.1 We 
have found a number of fruitful insights from the enactive-
phenomenological literature (including that of Dreyfus and 
Sudnow, but also of Francisco Varela, and many others 
working in the enactive tradition) on the jazz/improvisation 
domain. For some time we have been working in both direc-
tions, both using theoretical reflections to shed light on the 
jazz performances, and using the performances as a form of 
commentary on the theoretical issues.
Our work, which is partially confirmatory and partially 
critical of Dreyfus’s and Sudnow’s pictures of jazz skill-
building, will hopefully provide a useful illustration of 
how the domain of musical improvisation can provide new 
insights into the nature of skilled action, and to cognitive 
science in general. We will in particular address:
1. the under-recognized centrality of improvisation to char-
acterizing human expertise;
2. how temporality (at many different levels) conditions the 
in-the-moment creation of (jazz) improvisation;
3. the counterpoint between ego-less or mind-less intuitive 
unwinding, and deliberative, cognized, control in skilled 
performance, and in particular, in improvisation;
4. the open-ended nature of enactive creation of perceptual 
worlds for the improviser to improvise in and on, with 
direct agency and intention.
The present paper thus owes a great debt to the work of 
Dreyfusian embodied phenomenology—but also to Varelan 
enactivism. As a label, “enactivism” emerged from Varela 
and colleagues’ landmark 1991 volume (Varela et al. 1991). 
This book offered powerful critiques of certain assumptions 
then reigning within classical cognitive science, and par-
ticularly the dominance of the computer metaphor in much 
of the latter. Some of the central elements in the book were 
pre-figured in the work of Dreyfus, particularly in his What 
Computers Can’t Do (Dreyfus 1972), which assembled some 
deep weaknesses within classical cognitive science and AI. 
Over the decades, Dreyfus’s insights have been taken up and 
reworked in new ways (not always with adequate acknowl-
edgement to Dreyfus), by many people, including Varela and 
those working in the tradition that he inaugurated.2
As musicians working on honing our jazz skills, another 
work by Dreyfus which was of particular interest to us 
was the critique of cognitivist models of expertise that he 
co-authored with his brother Stuart (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 
1986). The five-stage model of skill acquisition offered in 
that work, designed principally to exhibit the limitations 
of computer-based “expert systems”, showed a suggestive 
1 The presentations have included an informal gathering of academ-
ics and musicians in North  London; a psychology workshop at the 
University of Bristol; and an interdisciplinary cognitive science semi-
nar at the University of Sussex.
2 Many affinities between the innovative approaches of Dreyfus and 
Varela are discussed in (Winograd and Flores 1986) with particular 
reference to classical cognitivist approaches to AI and cognition.
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way to understand the progressive growth in a given skill. 
According to this model, practitioners of a skill will tend 
to progress from the status of ‘novice’ to that of ‘expert’ 
over five broad stages, where the novice’s performance will 
often start off as intellectualized or theorized, and where 
true expert performance is characterized by a non-reasoned, 
intuitive form of skilled action (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986, 
p. 103). We believe that the case of jazz improvisation high-
lights particular limitations of Dreyfus’s model, and that this 
has implications for understanding the role of skilled action 
in general—as we shall see later.
We had each of us also been impressed by Sudnow’s 
Ways of the Hand (Sudnow 1978, revised 2001). Working 
as an ethnomethodologist, alongside pioneering sociologists 
such as Harold Garfinkel and Harvey Sachs, Sudnow used 
descriptive observation methods to lay bare implicit rules 
and assumptions enfolded within various socially structured 
ways of doing things, including death and dying (Sudnow 
1967), and computer gaming (Sudnow 1979). Ways of the 
Hand logged and explored the detailed stages in the growth 
of Sudnow’s own expertise as a jazz piano improviser. As 
Dreyfus noted in his 2nd edition preface, Dreyfus saw in 
Sudnow’s account many affinities with his own account of 
how people develop skills from the halting, self-conscious 
stabs of the novice to the ego-less flow of the full expert.3
In many ways Sudnow’s volume acts as a kind of hand-
book (no pun intended) for many jazz musicians who have 
read it. This may be partly because the book helps one, as 
such a developing musical practitioner, to progress in the 
mastery of one’s instrument or genre, and also because the 
processes he describes may bear some similarity to one’s 
own experiences of progress in skill-building. But also it is 
perhaps because the book shows how something that often 
presents to many, on a superficial glance, as a highly infor-
mal and “hang-loose” activity, can be framed within rigor-
ous, academic language.
1.1  Improvisation and enaction
Enactivism originally arose out the biological work of 
Francisco Varela and Umberto Maturana, who together pro-
pounded a new view of a living organism as an “autopoietic” 
(literally, “self re-creating”) unity operating under principles 
of internal coherence, rather than as adapting to an inde-
pendent world.4 The autopoietic view which Maturana and 
Varela propounded, evolved from its original biological 
focus on cells, nervous systems, etc., into a theory of cogni-
tion, experience and action—particularly that of humans. As 
developed by Varela, Thompson and Rosch (in their 1991) 
it became recast as “enactivism”. In our view, enactivism 
offers a productive vantage point from which to reflect on 
improvisation, both in jazz and more generally. Two phrases 
used by core enactivist texts seem particularly fruitful: “Lay-
ing down a path in walking; and “Sense-making”.
(1) “Laying down a path in walking”. This phrase, used 
as the title to the final chapter of (Varela et al. 1991), may 
be seen as expressing a central essential strand of the enac-
tivist approach. According to Varela, a human and/or any 
other biological being “lays down” a world, as one may “lay 
down a path” as one walks. The phrase also occurs in the 
title of a 1987 paper by Varela, whose primary focus was 
biology, but which he also saw as giving a novel cognitive 
and metaphysical outlook (Varela 1987)5. As Varela says 
of an organism’s relation to its world (ibid.): “It is not the 
mirroring of a world, but the laying down of a world”. And 
as Evan Thompson put it (Thompson 2007, p. 13), the first 
proposition of the enactive approach is that “living beings 
are autonomous agents that actively generate and maintain 
themselves, and thereby also enact or bring forth their own 
cognitive domains”.
The path a walker takes is of course not totally arbitrary, 
but is rather constrained and shaped by the conditions in 
the walker’s environment, (as well as by the walker’s con-
stitution, history, and skills). In a similar way the world an 
organism knows is not a totally other realm which has to be 
recovered in perception, but is rather a domain of signifi-
cances, or a set of possibilities that are made determinate by 
the organism’s actions, and established via the organism’s 
developing skills.
The trope of laying down a path in walking is derived 
from a celebrated poem of Antonio Machado, a Spanish poet 
of the late 19th and early twentieth century. Here is an Eng-
lish translation of the opening part of the poem, (quoted in 
full in Varela 1987):
Wanderer, the road is your footsteps, nothing else;
Wanderer, there is no path, you lay down a path in 
walking.
In walking you lay down a path,
And when turning around you see the road you’ll never 
step on again.6
3 Sudnow does not explicitly appeal to the Dreyfus five-stage model. 
However, a detailed comparison between the Dreyfus and the Sud-
now accounts of expertise can be found in Hendriks-Jansen (1996, 
p. 311 ff).
4 See Maturana and Varela (1986).
5 See also (Thompson 2007, p. 13; Varela et al. 1991 ch. 11).
6 Caminante, son tus huellas el camino, nada mas; Caminante, no 
hay camino, se hace camino al andar. Al andar se hace el camino, 
y al volver la vista atrás se ve la senda que nunca se ha de volver a 
pisar. A Machado, “Proverbios y cantares” (Machado 1912).
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This striking metaphor also captures a key feature of 
improvisation in jazz, and in other arts that feature extem-
porized performance. The jazz player is constantly bring-
ing forth novelty which is given existence in the moment of 
playing. Unlike the musical recitalist who takes a pre-written 
piece of music and renders in performance, the improvis-
ing musician generates the composition, (or elements of the 
composition) as the audience listens, rather as a street food 
seller cooks a dish in front of the customer. In the case of a 
pre-created composition, one can (in principle) edit, or re-
order, the composition before it is finally assigned for per-
formance. In case of improvisation there is no chance to edit 
or correct—one lays down the piece in playing. Machado’s 
lines even capture this unavailability of going back to correct 
one’s past performance: “when turning around you see the 
road you’ll never step on again”.
In jazz improvisation, there is, actually, sometimes the 
possibility of a kind of “post-editing”, where, for example, 
a note or chord that sounds incongruous or unsatisfactory 
can be recontextualized by the player’s (or a co-musician’s) 
offering of further notes that give it more sense as part of 
a longer sequence. However, Sudnow, for example, refers 
to such “post-editing” as only an intermediate stage of 
improvisation that is “very much backward-looking and 
[only] reparatively forward-going” (Sudnow 1978, p. 56). 
Yet at the highest levels of freedom, (in line with Machado’s 
wanderer), improvisation—and perhaps life—are inherently 
forward-going. The jazz pianist Herbie Hancock recalls an 
incident when playing with Miles Davis in the 1960s. Han-
cock, as a young, but already highly acclaimed pianist at the 
time, played a chord that sounded, as he thought, embarrass-
ingly off the mark. To his surprise, Davis just paused for a 
second, before responding (on his trumpet) with “some notes 
that made it right. .. with the choice of notes that he made, 
and the feeling that they had” (Cheadle 2015).7
(2) “Sense-making”. This phrase, which seems to have 
originated in a paper by Varela in the early 1980s (see Varela 
1984), is also one that Varela (and Thompson) saw as cen-
tral to what later became known as the enactive approach. 
As Thompson puts it (2007), “the nervous system does not 
process information in the computationalist sense, but cre-
ates meaning”. Looked at in terms of a biological organism, 
sense-making can be seen as a kind of interplay between the 
maintenance of self-identity by an organism and the world 
with which it maintains a sensorimotor coupling. The organ-
ism’s environment is a world of elements that matter to the 
organism, as assisting or threatening the latter’s self-main-
tenance. So the environment is not a neutral, exterior world 
but a world already interpreted as an array of self-generated 
significances. It is perhaps not too far a stretch to say that 
the continual unfolding of the process of an organism’s 
meaning-making encounter with its environment is like an 
improvising jazz musician generating musical responses that 
make sense in the context of her fellow players’ (and her 
own) previous musical “moves”.
The jazz parallel further suggests an extension of the idea 
of sense-making from a process enacted by an individual 
agent, into the inter-agential realm—as an ongoing interplay 
of mutual significances between members of a social group. 
Hanne De Jaegher and Ezequiel Di Paolo have described 
interactive encounters between two or more humans as a 
process of “participatory sense-making” (De Jaegher and 
Di Paolo 2007).8 The idea of mutual sense-making involving 
multiple actors yields a powerful, recursive picture of the 
complex reflections and interactions that occur in a group of 
people attending to each other’s attention. To take the dyadic 
case for the sake of simplicity: if two agents each attend to 
each other, each attends to the other, but also to the other’s 
attention, and to the other’s attention to their attention to 
the other’s attention, …. and so on. A complex nesting of 
relationships is thus set up—rather as two mirrors, held 
together, may generate a “tunnel” of images of reflections 
within reflections.
Obviously, the interpersonal relationships between jazz 
players in any given performance are, like any cultural or 
cognitive activity, shaped by the local social contexts within 
which any such performance takes place, and the broader 
socio-cultural history of the genre. The improvisatory nature 
of jazz performance makes it, we believe, particularly suited 
to be a model for a broader range of cognitive activity. This 
point has been well articulated by Michael Tomasello, who 
is perhaps one of only a few cognitive scientists to make 
an explicit connection between jazz improvisation and 
7 Hancock reflects that, unlike himself until this moment, Davis 
never judged what happened. Davis did not “hear it as a mistake. 
He heard it as something that happened, just an event, that was part 
of the reality of what was happening at that moment. And he dealt 
with it.” Hancock goes on to say “Since he didn’t hear it as a mistake, 
he felt that it was his responsibility to find something that fit. And 
he was able to do that.“Hancock recalls that in reflecting on this, he 
learned a central lesson not only about good improvisation in music, 
but also about life: “We can look for the world to be as [we] would 
like it to be. But the important thing is that we grow. And the only 
way we can grow is to have a mind that is open enough to experience 
situations as they are and turn them into medicine. . .Take whatever 
situation you have and make something constructive with it. That is 
what I learned in that situation from Miles“(Cheadle 2015). Simi-
larly to jazz, an open, non-judgmental mindset is also central to other 
forms of improvisation such as improvisational theatre (Johnstone 
1979).
8 For a specific application of participatory sense-making to music, 
see (Schiavio and De Jaegher 2017). The application of sense-making 
to human interaction has also been studied under the label “inter-
enaction”, see (Colombetti and Torrance 2009; Schiavio 2014; Schi-
avio and Cummins 2015; Torrance and Froese 2011).
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cognition in general. Critiquing traditional in-the-head mod-
els of thinking, Tomasello writes:
“…. [F]or humans, thinking is like a jazz musician 
improvising a novel riff in the privacy of his own room. 
It is a solitary activity all right, but on an instrument 
made by others for that general purpose, after years of 
playing with and learning from other practitioners, in 
a musical genre with a rich history of legendary riffs, 
for an imagined audience of jazz aficionados. Human 
thinking is individual improvisation enmeshed in a 
sociocultural matrix.” (Tomasello 2014, p. 1).
There are, of course, a number of other ways in which 
enactivist and allied approaches can be deployed to shed 
light on musical activity and improvisation in particular—
for example—theoretical concepts such as autonomy, envi-
ronmental embedding, dynamical embodiment, perception-
as-action, and so on, all lend themselves to being applied to 
jazz and other improvisatory art. Some of these concepts, 
and the bodies of theory that lay behind them, have been 
grouped together under the label “4E cognition”—an abbre-
viated way of summing up mind, cognition and action as 
embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive (Newen et al. 
Forthcoming; Menary 2010; Rowlands 2010). There have 
been many useful suggestions of how improvisation can be 
theorized in terms of the 4Es or Enactive framework.9
Some interesting conclusions may be drawn from these 
observations on the relation between improvisation and the 
enactive approach (and related approaches) to cognition 
and action. First, enactivism may offer a fruitful theoretical 
backdrop for understanding improvisation in jazz and other 
performance arts. Second, the case of improvisation (not 
just in jazz but more generally) may, in turn, offer a source 
for powerful ways of deepening enactive theory and other 
phenomenological and 4E approaches. Third, as enactivism 
is a theory with general application to agency, cognition and, 
indeed, life, it may thus be time for improvisation and related 
concepts to be promoted to taking on a more central place 
within cognitive science research per se. Perhaps, if such 
a promotion had taken place some decades ago, its subject 
area might have been rather different.
1.2  Improvisation and embodiment
In sum, we would suggest that jazz, given its improvisa-
tory nature, would be a good starting point for an alter-
natively reconstituted science of mind—where “mind”, as 
seen from this vantage-point, obviously includes a lot more 
than merely “cognition”. One obvious reason for that is that 
jazz, and music-making in general, for all their cognitive 
aspects, are highly embodied—the “hand” of the pianist, to 
use Sudnow’s key term; the mouth and breath of the flute 
or trumpet-player; the throat and lungs of the vocalist; but 
also the way the whole body of the player moves—whether 
seated at the keyboard or drum kit or standing holding the 
bass or blowing the sax. Music is embodied because of the 
interactive, unified way in which the musician is linked to 
her instrument. It is embodied also in virtue of the nature 
of our response to the music, whether as player or listener: 
jazz audiences, in particular, tend to explicitly register 
their listening through physical signals such as clapping, 
foot-stomping, whooping, etc.; players often make similar 
gestures in their performance. Again, as in all musician-
ship, jazz performance is about physical mastery of the 
skill of playing the instrument. Developing skillful musical 
agency involves assuming and assimilating various embod-
ied stances, postures and movements (Bowman 2004). This 
holds for improvisation in particular. In his phenomenologi-
cal report about learning how to improvise, David Sudnow 
relates his most substantial developmental transition towards 
improvisation to working on timing and temporal stances 
with his body after observing how Jimmy Rowles (a pianist 
described as a “musician’s musician”) moved on the bench 
(Sudnow 1978, p. 81 ff).
Being so emblematically embodied, jazz performance, 
apart from its intensively physical nature, is also often affec-
tively highly charged, and experientially vivid. As such, it 
incorporates many features of embodied activity that are 
marginalized within the traditional cognitive scientists. 
Indeed, jazz may present an embodied, but also cultural and 
social, activity that incorporates many aspects of what hap-
pens when we are spontaneous in life (Corea 2016; Mer-
cer 2007; NYU Steinhardt Jazz Studies 2014). However, 
with jazz improvisation the abilities of players span a wide 
spectrum of performance levels. Thus jazz presents ample 
opportunities to study embodied improvisation at multiple 
levels of proficiency, yielding insights into how such skills 
develop.10
Embodiment is, of course, one of the key terms grouped 
under the heading “4E cognition”. A large subset of the 
cognitive science research that takes embodiment seriously 
focuses on how our embodied interaction with the world 
can be productively discussed in terms of the dynamical 
progression in time of our bodily activity. The temporal flow 
of our embodied action plays a central role in understanding 
the nature of improvisation in performance. Temporality is 
9 See, for example, (Goldman 2013; Iyer 2004; van der Schyff 2017; 
Walton et al. 2015).
10 There has been a considerable literature discussing embodiment in 
relation to music in general. See, for example, (Krueger 2014, 2011; 
Laroche et al. 2014; Laroche and Kaddouch 2014; Linson & Clarke, 
2017; Loaiza 2016; Matyja and Shiavio 2013; Schiavio and De Jae-
gher 2017; Schiavio et al. 2014, 2017).
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a feature which complements the intensive physicality of 
jazz-making. We thus now move on to examining how jazz-
making, and improvisation more generally, is temporally 
enmeshed in a multiplicity of individual, social and cultural 
processes.
1.3  Improvisation and temporality
1.3.1  The spur of the moment
The most obvious way in which the notion of improvisa-
tion relates to temporality is in terms of its etymology: the 
word “improvise” is derived from the Latin Improvisus, 
or “unforeseen”. The term suggests an implicit contrast 
between performing a task “in the present tense”, as it were, 
without much prior preparation; and executing a task which 
has been pre-planned or pre-scripted, where steps in the 
task-fulfilment involve either reading off from a notated set 
of directions or working from a previously internalized set of 
rules. Much musical performance may, of course, be unfore-
seen by, or surprising to, members of the audience11—but 
improvised music is often unforeseen (or often has elements 
that are unforeseen) even by the performer, not to mention 
the other players.
We shall see later, however, that it is a mistake to link 
the “improvised” too closely with the “unprepared.” In 
fact a considerable amount of improvised performance is 
extensively planned in advance—and much jazz perfor-
mance includes, or is indeed mainly comprised of, playing 
from pre-written sheet music.12 Even in most contemporary 
jazz performance, where musicians may improvise singly 
or collectively over extended stretches, there will usually 
be pre-arranged structural constraints (for example, a prior 
agreement that a specific passage of improvisation should 
last for a fixed number of repetitions of a particular chord 
progression, or a fixed number of bars, etc., or that one of 
the ensemble should give a specific signal when it is time 
for a pre-composed section to be resumed).
But a good deal of the surprise and edge that is associated 
with jazz playing (see below for some commentary on this 
from musicians) comes from the fact that much of what is 
being produced is as much “in the moment” to the players 
as it is to the audience. So there are of course some notable 
free jazz performers or groups, where improvisation is the 
central determinant of what happens, and almost all pre-set 
parameters drop out of the performance.13
Another way of characterizing the unforeseen nature of 
(much) jazz is to say that certain key aspects of the compo-
sition take place in the time of the performance, rather than 
beforehand, as is generally the case with music prepared by a 
classical composer. So, while there may be much preparation 
in advance for any given jazz piece, much of the composi-
tion—at least during solo, or “group-blowing”, passages, 
takes place at the time that the music is “consumed” by the 
audience. So a distinguishing feature of improvisation in 
jazz, and of improvised performance more generally, is that 
preparation-time significantly overlaps with, or bleeds into, 
performance-time.
A number of jazz musicians have commented on this in-
the-moment aspect of jazz improvisation. When asked for 
a brief characterization of improvised music versus music 
composed before its performance, the jazz saxophonist Steve 
Lacy summed up the contrast as follows:
“In fifteen seconds the difference between composi-
tion and improvisation is that in composition you have 
all the time you want to decide what to say in fifteen 
seconds, while in improvisation you have fifteen sec-
onds.” [Quoted in “A Passion for Jazz: Music History 
and Education,” 2017 (online)].
More pithily, the pianist Bill Evans has said:
Jazz is the process of making one minute’s music in 
one minute’s time
(Quoted in Cavrell 1966, The Creative Process and 
Self-Teaching—film available on YouTube).
Jason Rebello, a prominent UK jazz pianist, has com-
mented as follows on the precarious, in-the-moment, nature 
of jazz performance, which often requires split-second reac-
tion and response:
It’s the unpredictability of life that drew me to jazz or 
improvising in the first place. The ability to sit there 
with no idea of what is going to happen next and to 
trust that whatever does happen will be ok, is one of 
the most vital qualities needed to improvise well. One 
thing I have found over the years, is that thinking does 
not really help the improvising process. If anything, it 
hinders it as it is too slow and clunky to be of use in the 
moment of a rapidly changing musical landscape.…
11 A celebrated example within the “classical” canon was the first 
performance of Stravinsky’s Rite of Spring, in Paris, on 29 May 
1913, which provoked a riot among outraged audience-members.
12 So, for example, many of the great jazz performances of big bands 
led by Duke Ellington, Count Basie and so on, allowed only very 
short improvised solo sections, performed by selected members of the 
band.
13 Historic examples of free jazz can be found in much of the work of 
Ornette Coleman, Cecil Taylor, Charles Mingus, Eric Dolphy, John 
Coltrane, and so on.
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(Rebello, private communication14).
1.3.2  Before the moment
While we have stressed the “in-the-moment” character of 
improvised jazz, it is important to stress that for any impro-
vised jazz work, much preparation for the moment of per-
formance will need to have been done in advance. Indeed 
a well-trained and well-rehearsed jazz musician will spend 
many hours in a week learning, and crucially, mastering, 
tonal and rhythmical relations in various harmonic and 
rhythmic systems, to exploit this practical expertise fluently 
in real-time performance. So there is something a little mis-
leading in the quotations above, as they both make it sound 
(when taken in isolation) as though the jazz is simply about 
just turning up and playing. In fact, as with any performance 
art-form, there will be a substantial pre-performance period 
devoted to skill-building, and to preparation for the specifics 
of any given performance.
This misconception is sometimes built into the way 
improvisation is conceived or defined. Thus one dictionary 
website gives the following as one of its two definitions of 
improvise: “to perform or make quickly from materials and 
sources available, without previous planning.” (https ://www.
colli nsdic tiona ry.com—emphasis added.) Again, dictionary.
com defines improvisation as “the art or act of … compos-
ing, uttering, executing or arranging anything, without previ-
ous preparation.” (Emphasis added.) However, as we have 
pointed out above, much improvised jazz is meticulously 
prepared beforehand.
It may surprise the newcomer to jazz to hear that impro-
vised elements in jazz may contain such strongly pre-fash-
ioned features. Is not the whole point of improvisation to 
“make it up as you go along”, to “let it all hang out”? In 
fact, the picture is a lot more complicated: there are many 
different aspects to improvised jazz, many or most of which 
will be addressed in offline rehearsal to make the actual per-
formance possible. Some of these aspects will involve rela-
tively restrained variations on the performed material; others 
will involve some rather more radical ways of generating (or 
searching for) novelty.
A linked point to this is that improvisatory features in 
jazz performance can usefully be thought of as lying on a 
spectrum from conservative to radical, or from “safe” to 
“risky”. At the more conservative end, the novelties that 
are generated in the performative moment may consist of a 
relatively limited set of variations along melodic, chordal, 
tonal, rhythmic and other parameters—although such perfor-
mances will be likely to be much more than straightforward 
recitals as if from musical scores on the page, and will still 
exhibit considerable amounts of spontaneity. At the more 
radical or “free form” end, one will tend to find a greater 
emphasis on more extreme kinds of novelty or exploration 
that may renounce any constraints during the time-frame of 
the performance itself. (See Fig. 1.)
Fig. 1  Improvisation in jazz: a 
spectrum
CONSERVATIVE / SAFE END
• keeping close to the original theme
(or “head”);
• adding stock ornamentaons to 
melody; 
• using standard chord-variaons; 
• using standard rhythmic variaons; 
• use of “library” paerns;  quong 
other tunes or rehearsed phrases;
• reliance on previous innovaons by 
other musicians; 
• focus on observing jazz convenons –
“correct” jazz ;
• emphasis on cognive control; 
• relavely low arousal state
[Examples:  Chet Baker & Bill Evans: 
The Legendary Sessions (1959); Count 
Basie, Duke Ellington, Louis 
Armstrong; Errol Garner]
RADICAL / RISKY END
• radical and full departures from 
convenonal tempi, chords, theme, 
etc.; 
• exploring unusual sounds or effects 
from instrument;  
• using instrument as sound producer 
rather than (just) as music device; 
• using ‘error’ to create new 
possibilies;
• maintaining edginess, rawness; 
• working off the expressing affecve 
state as well as musical content; 
• emphasis on intuive unfolding; 
• high arousal state
[Examples:  Ornee Coleman: The 
Shape of Jazz to Come (1959), Cecil 
Taylor, Andrew Hill, Evan Parker]
14 These remarks were given as part of some comments made by 
Rebello to an early sketch of our ideas on improvisation.
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In the middle ground between both extremes, one can find 
improvisation that strives to go beyond pure variations of 
existing structures without giving up on form entirely. Thus 
players may extemporize some dimensions of prior struc-
ture, such as the spontaneous re-harmonization of the har-
monic progression of a tune while remaining faithful to other 
features such as the tune’s original melody. On another level 
of novelty, improvisers occupying this middle ground may 
depart from standard roles in performance, such as soloist 
versus accompanist, in favour of equally co-leading roles for 
all. Notable pioneers in the latter were the musicians in the 
first trio led by pianist Bill Evans15 (Berendt 1982).
Yet common to all accomplished jazz musicians, even 
to those whose preference is to play at the radical or risky 
end of the spectrum, is that they will have put an prodigious 
amount of prior effort and time into rigorous off-stage prepa-
ration—both in isolation and with fellow-performers—of 
the many skills necessary to deliver fluent and convinc-
ing—as well as courageous and fulfilling—improvised 
performances.
This is well expressed in an interview conducted by Japa-
nese writer and Buddhist philosopher Daisaku Ikeda with 
Herbie Hancock and Wayne Shorter, two of the world’s lead-
ing jazz musicians. This is summarized by Ikeda as follows:
“Improvisation embodies the power to create value freely 
from an instantaneous encounter….At the same time, polish-
ing the power of improvisation to its true brilliance demands 
constant, unseen effort. As is only considerate and a sign of 
good faith, I prepare for dialogues by thoroughly studying 
the person with whom I will be talking.” (Ikeda et al. 2006, 
emphasis added).
1.3.3  Other temporal aspects
So far we have looked at temporality in improvisation in one 
broad way—in terms of the contrast between what happens 
in the before-phase of a performance—when a work is being 
prepared, composed, rehearsed, etc.—and the now-phase, 
when the work is being performed to an audience. Impro-
vised jazz (and improvised art in general) has what appears 
to be a special property: the two phases at least partly, and 
maybe significantly, overlap. We conjecture that this makes 
an important contribution to what people often describe as 
the ‘immediacy’ of jazz.
However, it is worth noting that there are many other 
ways in which improvised music displays time-related fea-
tures. For example:
• Multiple scales of temporality in performance.
Because of the way music performances unfold in time, 
it is natural to discuss the characteristics of such perfor-
mances in terms of various temporal features (which may 
vary according to period, region, genre, and so on). In jazz 
the most usual time-related features include time-signature, 
tempo, rhythm, syncopation; simultaneity and sequentiality 
(e.g. chords versus arpeggios); and so on. These features 
are largely shared with non-improvised music performance.
• Coordination/interaction dynamics within the temporal 
flow:
a. intra-player coordination: any musician’s skill will 
involve coordination along a number of elements inside 
the player’s body/brain boundary: for example, between 
hand and hand; hand and ear; between the player’s body 
and her instrument; and, where two or more players are 
performing,
b. inter-player coordination: there will be various kinds of 
interaction between players that take place in a near-
instantaneous or tightly sequential fashion. There are 
many analogies between temporal patterns in joint 
music-making and in conversation. For example in joint 
speech one has turn-taking modes of talking/listening, 
and overlapping or collective speech patterns (such as 
heated argument, verbal expression during love-making, 
by crowds at sports matches, and so on). Similar varia-
tions occur in joint music-making.
• Cognitive processing in improvisation: fast versus slow/
mindless versus mindful performance:
Improvised musical performance (as much other human 
action) is characterized by a tension between “fast” and 
“slow” thinking processes: in-the-moment composition 
often requires rapid, pre-conscious, intuitive processing, 
while players will also need to monitor and control perfor-
mance using slower, conscious, deliberative or mindfully-
engaged processing.16 Much of the skill of the improviser 
consists of knowing how to mediate between these two 
speeds of output. (We will return to this point later, when 
discussing Dreyfus’s account of expert cognition and skillful 
embodied coping.)
16 Compare Jason Rebello’s remark, quoted earlier, about (delibera-
tive) thinking—“… [it] does not really help the improvising process. 
If anything, it hinders it as it is too slow and clunky to be of use in the 
moment of a rapidly changing musical landscape.
15 The trio comprised of Evans, bassist Scott LaFaro and drummer 
Paul Motian. See, for example, their album Sunday at the Village 
Vanguard (1961).
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• Historicity and cultural embedding versus immediacy.
On a markedly longer timescale, it is obvious that much 
(most?) artistic production takes place within a historical 
tradition. Again there is another tension here: on the one 
hand there may be a more or less self-conscious acknowl-
edgement by the artist of the past legacy of one’s particular 
genre (stretching back years or centuries): this may generate 
constraints to which the artist more or less agrees to con-
form (for example the 12 bar blues pattern). In contrast (and 
again especially in improvised art) there may be a kind of 
“now-ness” to the playing, that departs from the traditions 
governing one’s idiom—possibly critiquing or challenging 
that tradition in various ways (self-styled “avant-garde” jazz 
takes such challenge as central).
1.4  The ubiquity of improvisation
Within Western academic musical communities, much 
discourse on music and teaching of music tends to view 
improvisatory art as unusual or anomalous, as a mode of 
musical performance that deviates from the normality of 
recitative music. So the musical skills that are taught aca-
demically are dominated by mastery of correct reading and 
playing from notated works by composers of distinction. It 
is not uncommon to find people who have been “classically” 
trained to find it very challenging to break the spell of the 
printed manuscript when invited to experiment with musical 
improvisation. Within such a mind-set, jazz, and improvisa-
tion in general, are considered to be a special case within 
music. However, in fact many musical traditions besides jazz 
treat improvisational skills as central to their genre. Further, 
it appears that many composers and recitalists within the 
Western classical tradition in earlier centuries appear to have 
used improvisation of different kinds quite frequently during 
their performances.17 Today European and North American 
music departments and conservatoires are much more likely 
to include improvisation as a core part of the curriculum 
than they were, say, 40 years ago.
So improvisation seems, perhaps unfairly, to occupy a 
rather anomalous, or specialist, position within many views 
of music production. Yet when we turn to improvisation in 
a wider context, the reverse may well be the case. How far, 
then, does the phenomenon of improvisation extend out-
side the artistic sphere? We could define improvisation very 
narrowly so that it only exists in art. However, that hardly 
accords with common usage, or with the strong intuition 
that something very much like what is exhibited within the 
jazz sphere occurs widely outside art.
The suggestion could indeed be made that improvisation 
is ubiquitous—maybe even the norm in life. Take walking 
around a town, for example. Most of the time, one might say, 
we “just walk.” But many aspects of the walk are spontane-
ous and improvised. We invent many things as we go. Do 
we amble, march or break into a trot? Do we cross the road 
here, or a bit further on? And so with many action-types 
in life: talking, eating, sleeping, washing, sport, and play. 
Humans improvise when making love, when fighting, and 
when giving birth—and there are perhaps improvisatory 
elements even in being born or dying. So, it would seem 
that, in much of life, we extemporize more frequently than 
we follow a script. As jazz pianist Chick Corea has put it: 
improvisation is not something special, but “living, just 
something natural.”18 And, as Walton et al. write (2015): 
“You can never step into the same river twice, never play the 
exact same game of soccer, never navigate your car through 
the exact same highway traffic, or cook your favorite meal 
the exact same way …”.
These considerations raise the further question: if improv-
isation is ubiquitous in our lives then surely it deserves to be 
discussed more centrally in cognitive science or in psychol-
ogy? Some areas of cognitive science—for example—those 
that revolve around notions such as situated action/cogni-
tion—may be thought to be particularly amenable to giving 
improvisation special status.
An early study in situated cognitive science (specifically 
of AI planning), which foregrounds improvisation is Agre 
and Chapman (1987).19 They suggest that the immediacy of 
real life makes the techniques for constructing action-plans 
in classical AI systems inappropriate (they dub this “capital 
P Planning”). In what they call “lower-case-p planning”, by 
contrast, the rules or recipes are relatively sketchy and the 
execution continually involves “rearrangement, interpola-
tion, disambiguation, and substitution” (p 268). As they put 
it: “[L[ife is a continual improvisation, a matter of deciding 
what to do now based on how the world is now.. . Life is 
fired at you point blank: when the rock you step on pivots 
17 Bach’s Musical Offering, based on a brief “Royal Theme” devised 
by the Prussian Emperor Frederick II, started out, so the story goes, 
as a three-part fugue extemporized by Bach, at Frederick’s request, in 
his palace in Potsdam in 1747 (see, e.g., Milka 2015). Some profes-
sional music writers are now becoming more aware that the absence 
of improvisation in standard contemporary classical music perfor-
mances is a lack rather than a virtue—see for example Clive Brown, 
“We’re playing classical music all wrong—composers wanted us to 
improvise” (Brown 2015).
18 Improvisation Piano Exercises with Chick Corea (YouTube 
video), (Corea 2016). See also Jordanous and Keller (2012), Linson 
and Clarke (2017) and (Higgins and Mantie 2013; Lewis 2009; Miller 
and Iyer 2010; Nachmanovitch 1990) cited in Van Der Schyff (2017) 
p. 1.
19 See Linson et al. (2015) for a more recent subsumption architec-
tural approach to improvisation.
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unexpectedly, you have only milliseconds to act.” (see also 
Agre 1988; Agre and Chapman 1987, p. 268).
These remarks harmonize with our earlier observations 
concerning the ways in which key notions within the enac-
tive tradition (laying down a path in walking; sense-making) 
already seem to suggest that improvisation is a general fea-
ture of lived action, rather than a side-show, and for that 
reason should be put into the foreground of a considered 
account of cognition and action. Dylan Van Der Schyff, 
writing in the field of music education, has similarly argued 
that improvisation is central, not merely to music, but to the 
understanding of human action and knowledge in general, 
seeing it as reflecting “the adaptive and relational nature of 
human meaning, and world making more generally” (Van 
Der Schyff 2017, p. 1). Van Der Schyff goes on to point out 
that much of the writing in the enactive (and, more generally, 
4Es) tradition within cognitive science may be considered 
as compatible with an outlook which regards lived activity 
as fundamentally improvisational in character. Indeed, Van 
Der Schyff entitles an important section of his paper “Cogni-
tion as embodied, embedded, enactive and extended and … 
improvised.” (van der Schyff 2017, pp. 9–11). We applaud 
this suggestion that improvisation should be given a higher 
profile within studies of cognition and lived action, and that 
the notion can be used to complement insights gained within 
enactive and related approaches.20 (It was suggested by a 
referee of our paper, that, in place of “improvised” one could 
rather add a 5th E, namely “extemporised” !).
2  What improvisers do
2.1  Dreyfus on skilled expertise
As a contribution to the role of improvisation within this wider 
discussion of cognitive science,21 we aim to provide a first step 
in considering how the character of the accomplished impro-
visational musician’s skill may help in deepening our under-
standing of lived action and cognition in general. For this, we 
first return to considering questions raised by Dreyfus about 
the nature of expert activity, which we see as a basis of improv-
isatory activity. Particularly, as touched on earlier in our dis-
cussion, we will focus on what he called “mindless, absorbed 
coping”, as well as on phenomenological accounts of expertise, 
both in practice and development. Focusing on improvisation, 
a key claim we will then make is that improvisational expertise 
in particular involves a non-deliberative, directive mental pres-
ence in the moment, both entangled with and extending the 
“mindless”, absorbed coping that Dreyfus and others have put 
at the centre of their accounts.
Dreyfus has forcefully argued for expertly skilled cop-
ing as a basis for human cognition. His argument rests on 
a critique of classical cognitivism that is shared by enac-
tivism and other theories stressing embodiment. According 
to classical AI-influenced theories of cognition, as seen by 
Dreyfus, expertise can be understood as an intellectualized, 
mastery of rules which are situation-independent, by a mind 
which is characterized in terms of conceptual understand-
ing, or analytical rationality. On his view such rules are ill 
equipped for the holistic forms of understanding that he sees 
as central to natural human cognition, and thus, by exten-
sion, also to improvisatory activity.
Dreyfus considered rules of that sort to be perhaps appli-
cable to certain artificial micro-domains, but inadequate for 
the vast majority of real-world contexts of human life, since 
real-world contexts are situation-dependent—that is, embed-
ded in the agent’s holistic real-world activity. Expertise, on 
his account, is exercised for the most part in an embodied, 
non-conceptual—and hence “a-rational”—way rather than 
through explicit rule-following.
As we saw earlier, a key notion of Dreyfus’s thinking is that 
humans develop such a form of practical wisdom in a staged 
developmental path, where only the last stage exhibits what 
Dreyfus considers true “a-rational”, embodied expert practice. 
Prior stages of learning expertise may actually involve practice 
that is relatively intellectualized and rationalistic. However, 
what the developing expert does is not merely to “interior-
ize a set of rules”. Rule-based practice is, rather, a scaffold 
that bootstraps a different form of learning that is then made 
properly embodied and contextual (Dreyfus 2005; Dreyfus 
and Dreyfus 1986). As an example that illustrates Dreyfus’s 
account, consider a learning golfer, whose approach to a mak-
ing a swing involves following, in a more or less conscious or 
deliberative fashion, a set of procedures for how to stand, grip 
the club, focus visual attention, follow through, etc.; whereas 
an accomplished golfer will execute such bodily and atten-
tional aspects of the shot in a single, effortless flow, with little, 
if any, exercise of conscious mind. Similarly, under Dreyfus’s 
account, a novice jazz musician may follow a collection of 
improvisational routines, more or less consciously constructed 
to produce the desired musical result;22 whereas the playing 
20 The main focus of Van Der Schyff’s paper, we should note, is to 
point to new directions for the understanding of music, and more 
specifically, of music education, rather than to make an intervention 
within cognitive science or theory of action.
21 See Linson and Clarke (2017) for a recent ecological/4E account 
of minimal system requirements for improvisation.
22 There are, however, more enactive models of music education 
being developed in which musical material is introduced via a less 
cognitivist approach (Laroche and Kaddouch 2014; Schiavio and 
Cummins 2015; van der Schyff 2017; van der Schyff and Schiavio 
2015) seeking to build a more dynamic, exploratory fashion that is 
perhaps closer to natural ontogenetic development (Spencer et  al. 
2006).
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of a seasoned soloist will tend to involve a fluent set of notes, 
without any detached awareness, in the moment of execution, 
of how the different component features that make up the play-
ing have been selected, or fit together. Veteran jazz pianist and 
educator Kenny Werner speaks of attaining “effortless mas-
tery” of an element of music as occurring when an improviser 
“owns” the element to a degree where he is able to use it with-
out giving thought to its execution (Werner 1996).
In a little more detail: (1) When learning a novel skill for 
which she lacks any prior contextual understanding a “nov-
ice” may begin her learning from a set of context-free rules 
that allow her to execute a range of actions in the domain, 
prior to any sense-making activity being possible. (2) Yet 
soon, as an “advanced beginner”, she will start to see some 
situational features that allow some first contextual distinc-
tions. (3) At the stage of a “competent performer” she will 
have accumulated an overwhelming number of both rules 
and contextual distinctions, and then is presented with the 
necessity to make decisions among the possible alterna-
tives that may apply. By having a choice, she enters a situ-
ation where her decisions may be more or less successful. 
From affective connotations related to perceived successes 
and failures, a notion of “significance” emerges. Her action 
choices now begin to matter to her. (4) Having a notion of 
significance, as a now “proficient performer,” sensations of 
risk and fulfilment begin to function as drivers for a new 
form of learning that transitions fully away from rule appli-
cation to a learning of properly situational discriminations 
and salient goals. (5) Last, as an “expert performer,” she has 
acquired a rich repertoire both of such contextual “sensations 
about,” and of contextual “actions within,” the domain. She 
sees in any given situation what can be or needs to be done, 
and immediately knows how to do it. Dreyfus has forcefully 
defended the view that at this point, the expert responds to 
the “full concrete situation,” and becomes absorbed in her 
“embodied coping”, such that mindful attention would only 
disrupt the process.
However, there have been extensive arguments both for 
and against this last point, the emphasis on mindless coping. 
We will now consider these arguments, drawing in particular 
on recent reports on the real-world phenomenology of expert 
action, as well as on enactive theory. The discussion will take 
as its context our overarching theme of (jazz) improvisation, 
which provides a distinctive perspective on this debate.
2.2  Slow versus fast thinking—system 1 and system 
2
Dreyfus’s philosophical view on mindless embodied coping 
fits in well with “dual process” accounts of human cogni-
tion (see, for example Daniel Kahnemann 2011; Stanovich 
2011). For Kahneman, expert performance that “flows” in 
the moment is supported by what he called “System 1”, a 
form of cognitive operation that is much akin to Dreyfus’s 
“immediate coping” in that it is rapid, intuitive, automatic, 
and pre-conscious. System 2, on the other hand is slower, 
reflective, and method-based. [Compare, for example, enter-
ing in your password in a fluent, routine way (system 1), 
with typing it in more carefully and with more alertness, 
when a couple of previous rapid shots have failed (system 
2)]. Following Dreyfus, one might say that it is only prior 
preparation in the early stages of expertise development 
that rely on a system 2 style of operation (see also Ericsson 
et al. 1993), characterized by what Dreyfus would term a 
situation-independent and domain-general form of rational 
thinking. But a system 1 style of operation will dominate 
the fluent, absorbed, “mindless” action of the accomplished 
expert (see also Beilock and Carr 2004; Dietrich 2004).
Dual-process theory is often discussed primarily in terms 
of “in-the-head” processing—hence the title of Kahneman’s 
book: Fast and Slow Thinking. But clearly it also appears 
to apply to embodied activity—and in particular to musical 
performance of varying levels of skill. Dreyfus would reject 
the idea that skilled activity (à la system 1) involves any-
thing that could be called “thinking” at all. Also Dreyfus’s 
account would appear to be readily applicable to a wide vari-
ety of cases which do not lie on a novice-expert spectrum—
cases such as play, chatting, food-preparation, dressing, etc., 
which are common in our lives, and where, as we observed 
above, improvisation seems to be ubiquitous.23
2.3  Debating mindfulness and rationality
However, how mindless is an experts embodied action? 
Recent investigations of the real-world phenomenology of 
skilled performance have put the notion of absorbed coping 
(as well as a simple dichotomizing of system 1 and system 
2) into question. Here we will argue that improvisation may 
be a mindful activity. This will put pressure on such an all 
too stark division.
Dreyfus’s views have been challenged by many peo-
ple. One notable example has been the philosopher John 
McDowell. In a debate with McDowell, initiated by Drey-
fus’s (2005) presidential address to the American Philo-
sophical Association, Dreyfus depicted McDowell as falling 
prey to “The Myth of the Pervasiveness of the Mental” (as 
Dreyfus later called it).24 According to this myth, as applied 
23 Even though Dreyfus applies the notion of expertise to the matters 
of our normal everyday life from childhood on, his model of learning 
applies largely to the acquisition of specialist skills later in life. How-
ever, ontogenetic development may arrive at similar forms of accom-
plished ability via more embodied and dynamic developmental routes 
(Oudeyer and Smith 2016; Thelen and Smith 1994).
24 Dreyfus originally entitled this “the Myth of the Mental” but 
changed the title as it gave a misleading idea that dismissing the myth 
involved dismissing the existence of the mental as such, rather than 
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to McDowell’s views, perception and action are essentially 
to be characterized as “conceptual and rational”. Dreyfus 
maintains, by contrast, that some activity—particularly the 
fluent, embodied agency of the accomplished expert, or of 
everyday familiar coping, is not pervaded by mind at all. For 
if it were, then, according to Dreyfus, it would be reflective, 
and so distanced—and as such the agent would not be fully 
engrossed in the act itself. Dreyfus quotes a description of 
a soccer player by Merleau-Ponty, for whom the “field of 
forces” on the pitch are not a set of objective facts which are 
“given” to the player; but where on the contrary “the player 
becomes one with it (fait corps avec lui)” (Dreyfus 2013 
citing Merleau-Ponty 1966, p. 168–169). So the Myth of the 
Pervasiveness of the Mental is, for Dreyfus, the view that all 
perception and action involves a kind of mental mirroring 
of the world, a view which, in Dreyfus’s account, ignores 
the kind of absorbed coping in which mindfulness is absent.
McDowell counters this by attributing to Dreyfus a dif-
ferent myth—the “Myth of Mind as Detached”. McDow-
ell concedes that mind, on his view, involves rationality 
and conceptuality, stating that “rational mindedness per-
vades the lives of the rational animals we are, informing 
in particular our perceptual experience and our exercises 
of agency” (McDowell 2013, p. 41). However, such ration-
ality and conceptuality does not need to be exercised by 
an agent through “a detached, contemplative relation to the 
world she experiences”. Rather, reasons for acting, and thus 
conceptual framing of the action in the situation, have to be 
available to the agent as and when necessary, as a kind of in-
principle capacity that can be exercised if, for instance, she 
is asked “Why did you do that?” So, for McDowell, the kind 
of absorbed coping which is at the centre of Dreyfus’s focus 
can indeed be accommodated within the former’s view, 
because, McDowell says, not all mindedness is displayed 
as a detached, rational, reflection on an action: rationality 
will also be present merely as a cluster of unactualized con-
ceptual capacities which come into play only as and when 
called for.
2.4  Rationality and embodied‑enactive suitedness
In a recent commentary on this debate, Shaun Gallagher 
has suggested that much of what McDowell says can be 
accepted, even while maintaining the spirit of what Dreyfus 
incorporates into his picture of absorbed coping (Gallagher 
2017, Sect. 10.3). Gallagher agrees with McDowell which, 
contra Dreyfus, there is a kind of rationality in those of our 
activities which embody absorbed coping. But, for Gal-
lagher, this does not have to be the kind of intellectualized 
rationalization that he thinks McDowell sees as involved (in 
potentiality, though not necessarily in actuality) in relations 
between human mind and world. Gallagher thinks there is 
an alternative way to conceive rationality, namely as “an 
embodied-enactive practice” (Gallagher 2017, p. 200). The 
world that the agent relates to is a world of affordances or 
requirements: the kettle is something we can use to make 
coffee; the dishes in the sink are perceived as needing-to-
be-washed, and so on. These affordances and requirements 
clearly are part of “the space of reasons”.25
As a development of this, Gallagher talks of the “rational-
ity…implicit in the hand” (Gallagher 2017, p. 200, see also 
Chap. 9). As he says, if I reach out to grab a banana, the 
configuration of my hand is different depending on whether 
I am going to eat it myself or hand it to you to eat, or pretend 
it’s a phone, or a gun. How my hand is shaped will differ for 
each of these cases—and these differences show, Gallagher 
says, how the way my hands (and, by extension, other parts 
of my body) shape themselves will display an “embodied, 
pragmatic rationality” which fits them into this or that situ-
ation in an appropriate manner.
The continually varying structure and dynamics of hand 
postures, crucial to musicians who use their hands to play 
their instruments, are of course illustrations par excellence 
of this rationality implicit in the hand—if, indeed, we follow 
Gallagher in talking of it in that way. We wish to question, 
however, whether the term “rationality” is being stretched 
too far here. It is true, as Gallagher goes on to point out, 
that hand gestures are intimately related with our linguistic 
communications: “The hand … transforms its movements 
into language (via gesture) and into thinking”. Indeed, 
human rational and conceptual capacities, as McDowell 
would agree, are closely bound up with our nature as lan-
guage-using agents, and our use of language for thought and 
communication.
Hand gestures, and gestures and postures of many parts 
of the body, can indeed be used for thinking and for com-
municative acts in this way. And this is also true of many 
non-human species.26 However, if we were to extend such 
enactive-embodied “rationality” to other species, it would 
frustrate an important objective in McDowell’s philosophy, 
25 Thus Gallagher talks of a world that is “laid out in perception … 
in terms of differentiations that concern my action possibilities—the 
object is something I can reach or not; something I can lift or not. . .” 
(Gallagher 2017, p. 200).
26 See (Hobaiter et  al. 2014; Leavens et  al. 2005) for how primates 
use their hands for pointing and other communicative acts. And of 
course dogs will pick up a lead in their mouth to indicate they want 
to be walked.
Footnote 24 (continued)
a certain position, attributed by him to McDowell, concerning how 
mindedness related to action. (See Dreyfus 2007, 2013; McDowell 
2007. For a later exchange, see, 2013; these, with other discussions in 
the debate, are collected in Schear 2013.)
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namely to use rationality as a way to characterize what dif-
ferentiates human mindedness and agency from that of other 
creatures. So this may not be a path that Gallagher could 
easily induce McDowell to come along.
The notion of rationality plays a normative role in this 
discussion. For example, in explaining why I make a cer-
tain move in a chess game, I am exemplifying rationality in 
showing why the move was chosen as the right one given 
the situation on the board. But not all normativity in action 
has to be assimilable to rationality in that way. In executing 
a golf drive a player makes a set of movements that have a 
normative relation to the goals and situation. But, we sug-
gest, this is not a rational normativity, but rather a kind of 
operative “suitedness,” as it might be called. Such normative 
characterisations will fit the enactive-embodied account of 
agency that applies to much of what we do—including the 
kinds of absorbed coping which are at the heart of what is 
at issue between Dreyfus and McDowell. It would surely 
be better to avoid the use of the term “rationality” in this 
context, if only because of the strongly intellectualist con-
notations of the term. For this reason, we would prefer to 
talk in terms of embodied-enactive suitedness (or meetness 
or aptness) of an action within a given situation.
2.5  Reflection in expert flow
So far this would suggest that Dreyfus may be right in dis-
puting the role played by notions such as rationality and con-
ceptuality in McDowell’s account of absorbed action in the 
flow. However, there is a certain tension in Dreyfus’s account 
which Gallagher’s discussion highlights well. Going back to 
the case of absorbed expert action in particular, it appears to 
be Dreyfus’s view that the exercise of expert agency-in-flow 
is necessarily non-deliberate, non-reflective, and mindless. 
When discussing the case of an expert downhill skier, Gal-
lagher points out that he may need “to reflectively consider 
changes in the texture of the snow, in order to anticipate 
possible adjustments to his skiing style” (Gallagher 2017, 
p. 201, footnote). This reflective thinking or monitoring 
would seem to be an integral part of the skier’s expertise, 
yet it looks to be in conflict with Dreyfus’s view that expert 
agency-in-flow is mindless and hence cannot contain ele-
ments of reflection. As reported by Gallagher (ibid), Dreyfus 
accepted this consequence (at a conference in 2006). Yet it 
seems a bizarre conclusion. When one executes a certain set 
of specialized skills one may often need to adopt a monitor-
ing or quasi-reflective stance, alongside of, and integrated 
with, the operation of one’s well-practised moves, in the flow 
of the skilled exercise.
In the present writers’ experience as jazz players, this 
is particularly so for musical improvisation. Notwithstand-
ing Jason Rebello’s remark (cited above) that thinking is 
often too “clunky” to do more than interfere with the flow 
of one’s improvisation in the moment of performance, there 
are frequent cases where the musician employs forms of 
monitoring and observation during the performance. As we 
have elsewhere proposed in the skilled attention hypothesis 
(Clark et al. 2015), part of the skill of the accomplished per-
former is to integrate such monitoring processes seamlessly 
into the flow of the play. So an embodied-enactive account 
that is adequate to this kind of case will be one where (to use 
the language of Kahneman) system 1 and system 2 forms of 
operationality are woven together within the ongoing skilled 
performance. So skilled action-in-the flow is not necessarily 
mindless.
Indeed, a growing number of recent phenomenological 
discussions of this topic suggest a prominent role for mind-
fulness in real-world performance. For example, as with a 
skier’s adjustment to the conditions of snow discussed by Gal-
lagher (above), Sutton et al. observe that elite cricket players 
adjust their batting to hit a shot through a slim gap in the field, 
where the action is fast enough for it to be like a reflex, but 
nevertheless is context-sensitive in a way that actions requires 
mindfulness about the in-the-moment disposition of the play-
ers (Sutton et al. 2011, p. 80). Similarly, for basketball players, 
rather than leading to “choking” (Beilock and Carr 2001; Cap-
puccio 2017), it is important that they pay deliberate attention 
to their dribbling of the ball at just the right moments in the 
play (Montero 2016, p. 100). In a related way, chefs, despite a 
perception of their cooking as driven by feelings of “this has 
to be there, this feels right here”, also report the importance 
of never ceasing to learn; and as Bermúdez points out, there 
would be no possibility of learning if “the mind is shut off 
during performance” (Bermúdez 2017, p. 2).
2.6  Playing with intention
Reports in the domain of musical performance in particular 
highlight a further function of mindfulness beyond such con-
text sensitivity that we see as central, but that is left out so 
far. This is the role of mindfulness in forming (spontaneous) 
action that is intentional and goal-directed. Many classical 
performers stress the importance of directing musical perfor-
mance with a clarity of intention, and see it as a mistake and 
a myth that a mindless performance in-the-moment should 
be what leads the music (as Dreyfus suggests). For cellist 
Ingal Segev, such elimination of thought in the performance 
also eliminates the playing as driven by the artist’s ongo-
ing conception or image of the music as it unfolds in time, 
based, as it is, on copious prior study and practice (Montero 
2016, p. 100). Heinrich Neuhaus, the teacher of classical 
pianist Sviatoslav Richter and author of what is considered 
one of the most authoritative books on piano pedagogy, The 
Art of Piano Playing (Neuhaus 1967), even links the success 
of gifted students such as Richter to the clearest formation 
and expression of the musical-artistic intention. To Neuhaus, 
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work on the artistic image (“Arbeit am künstlerischen Bild”) 
is of the utmost importance, since a lack of awareness of 
the musical intention leads to a performance that does not 
express the character of the music, but evokes “instead of 
the language a murmuring, instead of a clear thought mea-
gre rips of it, instead of a strong feeling powerless efforts, 
instead of the deeper logic ‘consequences without causes’, 
instead of poetic images their prosaic leftovers”27 (Neuhaus 
1967, p. 1). As we shall see below, given the importance 
of playing within a musical language, a form of mindful 
embodied-enactive suitedness, allowing for meaningful 
intentional action within the domain of music, is perhaps 
even more central to the improviser’s efforts to spontaneous 
musical creation.
In a similar way, Høffding’s interviews with the Danish 
String Quartet point to a role for kinds of mindful reflection 
at varying levels of agency in the performance. Høffding 
comes to view absorption in musical performance (as tar-
geted in Dreyfus’s account) more as a “passiveness” about 
certain aspects of the performance than as a “mindlessness” 
in the performance (Høffding 2014; Salice et al. 2017). This 
is seen as resulting from a control of the instrument as a tool 
that is temporarily integrated into the body schema, so that 
many details of the instrument can be forgotten (see also 
Schiavio and De Jaegher 2017, for a notion of “incorpo-
rated control” by the musician of her instrument). Høffding 
goes on to say, however, that body schematic control over an 
instrument does not imply a mindless control of the music. 
Beyond a body-schematic instrumental control, musicians 
have to exercise agency on various levels of the musical 
performance proper, including that of the music itself, but 
also, for example, the affective connotations of the playing, 
and their interactions with other musicians.
2.7  An improviser’s innards
In what follows we take this last point on agency within the 
domain of music a little further, with implications on the nature 
of an improviser’s skills. In line with the role of mindfulness 
for the music itself, David Sudnow’s phenomenological analy-
sis of his own path towards becoming a proficient improviser 
(Sudnow 1978) suggests that, as expert musicians and impro-
visers achieve a transparent control over their instrument, they 
do not enter a stage where their playing reduces to an absorbed 
mindless coping. Rather, expert musicians, and improvisers 
in particular, gain an ability to achieve an embodied-enactive 
suitedness or aptness (as we have called it) in their playing, that 
allows them to act with high-level agency on the music itself. 
In doing so, they come not to fully disappear in, but rather to 
express themselves via, musical utterings. From this angle, we 
perceive one weakness in Dreyfus’ view of absorbed coping—
at least with respect to improvisation—to be that he seems to 
assume a pre-given domain that is rendered mindless once it 
is mastered. However, we suggest that alongside the notion of 
performance-in-the-flow elaborated by Dreyfus, there has to be 
emphasized a never-ending developmental aspect of enactive 
creation. In improvisation one is, as in learning, faced with 
a certain “breakdown” of one’s habitual skills in continually 
occurring novel constraints from the interaction with the world 
(Di Paolo et al. 2014). So a sense-maker must, to some degree, 
continuously engage with new situations she has not until now 
come to perceive or act in. This creates an (for her, previously 
non-existent) aptness and normativity concerning how to walk 
the very walk she is walking, or (for the music improviser) the 
music she is playing.28
Sudnow provides vivid reports of such continuous expe-
riential “appearances” or “openings” of co-developing 
normativity and aptness (see, for example, Sudnow 2001, 
p. 77; the terminology is not his). In setting out to learn 
how to improvise music, he depicts his initial perception of 
the piano as purely visual-spatial, significant only in terms 
of  successful reaches for certain keys in space; but much of 
the book is about how, during this path, he bears witness to a 
continuous bringing-forth of novel, and eventually musical, 
experiential relations with his instrument. Once he had suf-
ficiently mastered the visual-spatial world, he came to enter 
a world of sound in which he was concerned not so much 
with the pressing of the keys, as with the formation of direct 
intentions within the musical domain.
Such a first foundational transition in his experiential 
relation with the piano was marked when for the first time 
he began to feel “expressly aiming for the sound of [a] par-
ticular note, that the sounds seemed to creep up into my fin-
gers, that the depression of the keys realized a sound being 
prepared on the way down, that I had gone to do them” 
(Sudnow 1978, p. 37). He was now not any more “going 
for good places … [but] aiming for sounding spots” (ibid). 
Multiple further cases of such experientially transforma-
tive shifts occurred during his learning, described in great 
detail, when, beyond a world of sound, Sudnow came to 
create for himself the worlds of (and aptness for) melodies 
(p. 38 ff), harmonies (p. 50 ff), and rhythms and phrasings 
(p. 81 ff). Each of these neither emerged as complete, nor 
27 Translated by the authors from the German edition, in which this 
passage reads as: “anstelle der Sprache kam ein Gemurmel heraus, 
anstelle des klaren Gedankens kärgliche Fetzen eines solchen, 
anstelle eines starken Gefühls kraftlose Bemühungen, anstelle der 
tiefen Logik ‘Folgen ohne Ursachen’, anstelle poetischer Bilder ihre 
prosaischen Reste.” (Neuhaus 1967, p. 1).
28 Di Paolo et. al’s adaptation of Piaget’s concept of equilibration 
for an enactive theory of perceptual learning explicitly addresses the 
“open-ended nature of human learning” (Di Paolo et al. 2014, p. 1), 
and points also to the need for an agent’s” intrinsic normative evalua-
tion” (ibid) for such learning.
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as globally available, nor in a single moment, but rather, as 
with other forms of enactive perceptual sensorimotor learn-
ing,29 in a continuous locally-contextual unfolding, yielding 
an additionally gained way of knowing—until, much later, 
he could express himself more globally in a way he saw as 
being intentional and meaningful in a language of jazz.
This aspect of Sudnow’s account particularly reverber-
ates with the present authors’ experience as jazz players. 
Given such an account, we think Sudnow’s path renders a 
view on mastery and expertise that actually diverges from 
that advanced by Dreyfus. Attaining aptness in the control 
over one or another aspect of his developing craft did not 
render Sudnow’s improvisatory playing mindless, but rather 
enriched it with novel features, musical objects and con-
textually appropriate novel ways for musical enacting. And 
as Sudnow reports (along with other experts), this process 
seems to be an indefinite one. However, Dreyfus’s account 
seems to be one that implies that an expert will approach 
a summit, where the performance is rendered mindless. 
In contrast, we argue that a better view is one of continual 
exploration and perfection—especially for peak improvisers. 
Enacting novel worlds never ends.
Thus we arrive at a somewhat different conclusion than 
that offered by Dreyfus himself about Sudnow’s account. For 
Dreyfus, Sudnow’s journey towards improvisation “reaches 
its climax, [when] there is finally no longer an I that plans, 
not even a mind that aims ahead, but a jazz hand that knows 
at each moment how to reach for the music.” [See Dreyfus’s 
foreword to (Sudnow 2001), p. x]. However while Sudnow 
does talk of his hand to coming to “know” and gaining a 
“potential for musical action”, his account does not appear 
to imply that one’s mind goes fully blank in absorbed coping 
as one comes to master “musical reaching” in improvisa-
tion. Rather, Sudnow’s account illustrates the open-ended 
path of enactive perceptual learning that continues to create 
novel objects and, eventually, novel experiential domains 
(Di Paolo et al. 2014).
A key claim we wish to make here, then, is that in improv-
isation, in addition to a basis in open-ended perceptual 
learning, also the formation of novel intentions for action 
is open-ended; and that spontaneously creating novel forms 
of agentive goal-directedness lies at the heart of improvisa-
tion—and, indeed, of life. The improvising mind enacts a 
form of hierarchical higher-level sense-making over the pos-
sible perceptions of the moment, as well as over the possible 
sensory-motor schemes available for action in the now. At 
its highest level, this may be seen as a form of “inner sense-
making” that flexibly creates novel intentions in the present 
moment. A making-sense not only of the external world but 
also of the realm of potentially available actions and their 
expected consequences, creating (or “finding”) in real time 
novel ways of “intending”. This may be what pianist Bill 
Evans refers to when saying—quoted at the beginning of the 
paper—that “direct deed is the most meaningful reflection” 
(Evans 1959, emphasis added). In this, the improvising mind 
goes beyond an expert’s mindful monitoring of a pre-given 
course of action, that intends to execute a pre-given image 
that was formed during (often extensive) prior practice. One 
might perhaps say that expertise is more an endeavour of 
sense-exploitation or sense-remaking, while improvisation 
is, rather, an activity of in-the-moment sense-making, or 
sense-exploration.
This is, obviously, not to suggest, simplistically, that 
improvisation is essentially free, and that expert recitative 
performance is essentially constrained. Each occupy differ-
ent regions on a constraint-freedom continuum that may be 
seen as underlying spontaneous thought and action (Christoff 
et al. 2016). An expert recitative performer, residing towards 
the more constrained end of the spectrum, has choices of 
direct action that are more familiar. The recitalist is, in per-
formance, re-telling a story that is already composed and 
written, even though such performers may aim to tell the 
story as if it were for the first time. On the other hand, the 
expert improviser, residing at the more unconstrained end of 
the spectrum, has prepared (in equally extensive prior prac-
tice) a large number of directly available choices of action 
with which, within the performance, she seeks to tell a nar-
rative that is composed as it unfolds.
So, we suggest, the cognitive process of improvisation in 
jazz—and in life—can be conceived of as a form of inner 
sense-making, an explorative higher-level making-sense of 
the direct possibilities of what the situation could be made 
into. Such making-sense of the inner domain of possibilities 
for meaningful (musical) perception and action and their 
respective consequences creates a novel perception (or inten-
tion) about what the situation should be made into.
In this way, we suggest, the expert player is not someone 
who is mindlessly absorbed, as in Dreyfus’s account, but 
rather one who gets to aptly express her self in continually 
novel ways (small or more drastic). Consequently, in place 
of Dreyfus’s picture of the ego-less, absorbed expert impro-
viser who is without an “I that plans”, we have an improviser 
whose acts are the spontaneous expression of a self. This, we 
believe, is how best to recast—or extend—Dreyfus’s account 
of the absorbed expert, through the lens of improvisation.
3  Summing up
This paper takes as its focal centre of interest the world of 
the improvising jazz musician. It draws upon the background 
of the authors, both of whom have some practical experience 
29 See (Di Paolo et  al. 2014) for an enactive theory of perceptual 
learning.
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of playing jazz (but more importantly, a deep admiration 
of the real experts in the art). Inspired by Sudnow’s Ways 
of the Hand, our shared interest in the phenomenology of 
jazz, and the exploration of its practice, has led us to reflect 
on the jazz player’s improvisatory expertise. Improvisation 
in performance art, and the expertise of the in-the-moment 
creator, provides a rich canvas from which to explore the 
nature of improvisation and expertise more generally within 
our daily lifeworld.
The assertion that improvisatory behaviour is ubiquitous 
within everyday life appears as both unsettling and banal. 
Banal because, once it is expressed, it seems too obvious 
to make much of (but we question that). And it is unsettling 
because of the apparent lack of serious work, within the 
mind sciences and philosophy, on the nature of improvisa-
tion, and on how the latter contrasts with non-improvised 
behaviour. How might the field be different if improvisa-
tion had a more central place? We have made some inroads 
here on this, and we have mentioned some valuable work 
by others, for example, the suggestion that the phrase 4E be 
extended with an additional I for “improvised” (or a fifth 
E for “extemporised”); but there is a vast territory to be 
worked on.
In the first part of the present paper, we have explored the 
activity of improvisation against the theoretical backdrop of 
work by Dreyfus and other authors. Dreyfus is celebrated 
as a forthright critic of the limitations of the cognitivist 
approach to mind (both artificial and natural). Enactivism 
has strong links to Dreyfus’s work, sharing roots in continen-
tal phenomenology, and an anti-cognitivist stance. We have 
suggested ways in which enactivism also provides a rich 
source of insights on improvisation—for example—through 
its central notion of “sense-making”, but also other notions.
Since improvisation is essentially a form of creation in 
the moment (the creativity often spurred by the moment), we 
thought it important to articulate some of the ways in which 
temporality is crucially bound up with improvisation in a 
mesh of different time scales, both as an artistic discipline 
and as a daily practice. We cite the affirmations of several 
jazz musicians about their work, which bear testimony to 
this. This opens up another rich seam to be explored further, 
both in relation to jazz and other improvisatory art, and in 
a broader context.
In the second part of the paper, we turned our attention 
to the cognitive processes behind an improvising musician’s 
expertise. Dreyfus has been a, or the, major contributor to 
our understanding of the nature of expertise. The debate 
between Dreyfus and the AI community has been particu-
larly instructive in terms of understanding the limitations 
and potential of artificial cognitive systems for reproducing 
aspects of human expertise. But we have focused on another, 
more recent, debate engaged in by Dreyfus (principally with 
John McDowell): the role of mind or ego in the activity 
of the fully proficient expert. Dreyfus takes the flow of the 
accomplished expert, or the virtuoso performer, in art and 
in sport, for example, to be a mindless flow—and so, too, for 
one’s “absorbed coping” in other, less lofty, achievements. 
Although Dreyfus appears rarely to focus specifically on 
improvisation in the relation to absorbed coping, his views 
are of particular relevance in that area. We have challenged 
his claim that expert performance in-the-moment, in particu-
lar if improvised, is mindless or egoless.
Looking at observations by McDowell, Gallagher, Sud-
now, and several other writers, we have concluded (as have 
others) that the Dreyfusian account has to be carefully 
rewritten, or extended. In our own distinctive account (which 
applies particularly to the case of improvisation, but which 
may have more general application), we suggest that expert 
improvisers do not enter a stage of absorbed mindless cop-
ing, but are instead on a path of open-ended expansion (and 
sometimes transformation) of their mindful experiential rela-
tion with their doing. For instance, a player’s engagement 
with the piano’s keys may unify with the piano’s sound, until 
she becomes habituated to perceive and act with direct, non-
deliberative, intentional agency on musical features such as 
melodies, the form of the flow, the affective connotations of 
the playing, and so on.
We propose that at the heart of an improviser’s exper-
tise (and indeed, of day-to-day living) lies the spontaneous 
creation of novel forms of agentive goal-directedness. Both 
drawing on, and extending, enactive theory, we suggest that 
such improvisatory ability is grounded in a form of “higher-
level inner sense-making” that operates in the moment 
over a rich realm of perceptual relations and sensory-motor 
schemes that have been established in prior practice. By 
this, summing up, we supplant Dreyfus’s idea of the ego-
less absorbed expert, as applied to improvisation, by that of 
an improviser enacting spontaneous expressions of a self.
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